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Abstract 
By being part into the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma, this research takes its framework in a 
historical analysis of relations between rebel groups and governments, in order to better understand the 
mechanisms of demands and negotiations between these two actors. In this paper, we propose to test 
the validity of the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma in Latin America, and to provide specific 
precision to this geographical area. For that, our approach proposes an historical and political study on 
data going from 1945 to 2019. The study is characterized by the creation of specific classifications and a 
relative power indicator of the rebel groups, making it possible to highlight new specificities of the rebels' 
credibility dilemma. The results show that globally the theory seems valid on the studied area, but that 
new parameters can be implemented to the initial theory, namely the search for popular and international 
credibility, through a general model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma. 
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The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma: A New Approach to the Search for Credibility 
Towards the International Community and the Population 
Theò Bajon 
The study of rebel groups, and more particularly the relationship between the dyad formed by 
rebel groups and governments, is a key scientific issue in conflict management and the promotion 
of peace around the world (Nilsson, 2010). In recent years, this field of research has benefited from 
many studies that gradually makes it possible to better identify the various issues of this problem 
while developing different approaches that are essential in the field of conflict resolution (Ishiyama 
& Batta, 2011; Péclard & Mechoulan, 2015; Berti, 2016). 
The interactions between rebel groups and governments, and especially the study of the rebel 
groups’ demands, are of particular interest. The rebels' credibility dilemma theory aims to better 
understand these interactions and especially the nature of the demands according to the power of 
the different rebel groups. This approach, already tested on specific geographical areas (Thomas 
et al., 2016), is intended to constitute a more global theory about the behavior of rebel groups 
within a game theory system. 
While attempting to confirm the initial hypothesis of the rebels' credibility dilemma theory 
through new research methodologies and procedures, we sought to develop a more complex 
approach through further empirical and theoretical analysis. With the uptake of a relative power 
indicator and multiple demand categorization scales, we sought to better understand the collected 
data and derive results. This approach helped us to identify two new third-party actors to the 
original dyad: the international community and the population. It also allowed us to suggest a new 
model of the rebel credibility dilemma grounded in game theory. 
The paper unfolds as follows: In the next section, we draw up a literary review of the subject 
and issues related to the question of our study and the main challenges of this academic field. In 
the following section, we list the different methodological phases starting with the general 
theoretical framework, the complete description of the method and the methodological protocol, 
while presenting our data. Finally, we present the empirical results obtained and theorize our 




Our study is directly part of a recent research process, which has gained prominence in recent 
years and opens a new area of study regarding the game theory of rebel-government negotiations 
(Fearon, 2013). In this area of the negotiations between rebels and governments is a more specific 
movement, namely the study of rebel behavior and about what these behaviors and actions can 
explain, always being part of the game theory and the theoretical framework of international 
relations, considering both groups as actors (Richardson, 1998). 
The study of the factors that can lead to rebellion also offers a study of the behavior of 
governments facing the threat and the specific political situation at the regional or national level, 
allowing a real application today to the preservation of peace and conflict resolution in the world 
(Arena & Hardt, 2014). 
In this field of study, we rely at first glance on the work done by Thomas, Reed, and Wolford 
(2016). The concept of a rebels' credibility dilemma is characterized by a theorized conjecture 
observed in a regional study over a specific period of time. This concept theorizes that the more 
objectively weak a rebel group is in comparison to the government, the more its own demands, 
directly or indirectly submitted to the government, will fall within areas of government sovereignty 
(Philpott, 1995), and this, in order to create some credibility in the relationship between itself and 
the government (Maoz & Terris, 2006). Thus, the concept of the rebels' credibility dilemma is 
anchored directly in a bilateral relationship between two defined actors maintaining a 
relationship—even if it is conflictual—and interacting together in a game theory, where the main 
issue here would be the credibility for the rebel group. Thus, the credibility of an actor in this 
context can be defined as the extent to which each actor believes in the other one statements, 
threats, or promises but also its ability to deliver a promised agreement (Maoz & Terris, 2006). 
Starting from this fundamental notion, we first sought to demonstrate empirically the concept 
by relying on a different geographical area and a longer period. This is to broadly support the way 
in which we conduct this research, to take into account the specifics of the dilemma and the 
enlargement of the data. Extending the time frame of our study makes it possible to place ourselves 
in a more general movement of rebellions having taken place after 1945 and thus to better 
characterize contemporary evolutions which are associated with this period (Gurr, 1993). The 
focus on a new geographic area allows supporting the first study, but also to expand to a very 
specific area by its characteristics inherent in the rebellion processes, while considering the fact 
 3 
that a globalized study is quite expensive in committed means and difficult to achieve at the risk 
of implementing methodological biases by omitting the particularisms of the regions studied 
(Wiarda, 2019). 
However, certain limits to the initial concept appeared to us, which prompted us to develop a 
new methodology, and enabled us to identify other factors and other essential actors, which are 
not necessarily characteristic of the geographical area studied, but which seem to fall particularly 
on the period studied—from 1945 to the present day—and the geographical area studied: Latin 
America.  
For that, it was essential to rely on another aspect of the scientific literature in order to complete 
the rebels' credibility dilemma theory. On the one hand, it is the search for popular credibility and 
all the works concerning the popular representation of governments and rebellion movements that 
have helped us to better understand a fundamental aspect of the area and the temporality studied 
(Bhavnani & Ross, 2003). On the other hand, it was also important to look at the international 
perception of rebel groups and how they could be dealt with in order to better understand how 
demands could be linked and play a role at the international level in the credibility sought by rebel 
groups (Arjona et al., 2015). 
The specificities of the area and the multiple issues studied also prompt us to consider global 
work around transnational issues and particularly around the relationship between populations and 
international bodies. The importance of non-state actors through populations and international 
institutions holds a preponderant role in the work of Keck and Sikkink (1999), in particular as 
regards globalized states. Our study is therefore positioned within these international networks 
through the examination of special relations between governments and rebel groups, but also 
around relations between rebel groups and populations, as well as relations between rebel groups 
and international institutions, through these networks. In this, the study of the geographical area 
that constitutes Latin America seemed perfectly adapted to shed light on certain important 
mechanisms and thus present a new model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma. 
We thus wish to corroborate not only the initial hypothesis of rebels' credibility dilemma, but 
also through our results and our methodology, that of the existence of significant interconnections 
between all these actors, seeking to influence each other around central challenges in a globalized 





It seems important to clarify the general theoretical framework in which our initial methodology 
fits, to better understand how we built our own methodology to meet specific needs. 
The first theoretical assumption in which we must inscribe is materialized in the fact that we 
envisage that relations between rebel groups and governments can be described as relations 
between two actors (Krasner, 1984) who each represent their wills and interests within the 
demands expressed. These relations can lead to two solutions: a peace agreement (or at least a 
ceasefire); or the beginning of a bellicose process between the two actors (Jenne et al., 2007). 
This game between state and non-state actors is a game whose information seems to be 
asymmetrical both on the side of rebel groups and on the side of governments (Butler & Gates, 
2009). Thus, when one of the actors makes a demand—whether or not it is directly addressed to 
the other actor—it is very difficult for the one to anticipate the reaction of the other actor. In 
addition to the own and inherent composition of the two actors, we can identify two other types of 
actors that influence the two actors of the dyad and that we highlight in the fourth section of our 
study: the population and the international community (Philpott, 2001). 
The study of this game as such is very interesting to describe, as did Thomas, Reed, and Wolford 
(2016) in their work. As an initial baseline study, we decided to base ourselves on the conclusions 
drawn by the authors in order to verify the hypotheses and conclusions of the theory, while 
complementing the theory through the results obtained.  
The rebel credibility dilemma, as theorized and analyzed in the initial reference work, 
introduces the hypothesis of general credibility that would be of some importance to rebel groups. 
Indeed, it seems that credibility, and more specifically the quest for credibility, can influence the 
demands made and their importance when they are issued (Sobel, 1985). The initial theory also 
posits the principle that rebels seem to make demands – no matter how large the demands are – 
only when the rebel group is sufficiently optimistic about its chances of facing the government in 
the event of a commitment to direct conflict. It is important to clarify the notion of credibility in 
the sense of the original study to better understand the evolution that we are driving at within this 
initial concept. Indeed, in their work, Thomas, Reed, and Wolford understand the concept of 
credibility as an attractiveness of the continuation of the fighting from the point of view of rebel 
groups in opposition to a threat to fight for governments if the demands of rebel groups are not 
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met. We therefore wish to develop the notion of credibility within our theorization and model, in 
order to limit it to the mere threat and attraction of combat (Gibbs, 2017). The rebels’ credibility 
dilemma is a dilemma in the sense that the rebels seek to give weight to their action and therefore 
indirectly to gain recognition as a specific actor (Huang, 2016). The dilemma therefore arises 
through the initial hypothesis put forward. To gain credibility in general, a rebel group will be 
tempted to make more important demands than what it is theoretically capable of asking in a 
negotiation process with regard to its power, in order to appear, through its demands, more credible 
and therefore stronger. The dilemma therefore stands out with the hypothesis of an illusion of 
power through the idea that a weaker rebel group will make greater demands. 
All of this seems to contrast the initial theoretical choice of considering both governments and 
rebel groups as actors, which would seem rational (Moore, 1995). As a result, it would also appear 
that the likelihood of rebel groups making at least a request for government sovereignty—which 
is, likely to alter state sovereignty in any way (Thomson, 1995)—would increase in proportion to 
the importance of the military capabilities of rebel groups. 
The anchor point of our study lies in the latest theoretical and empirical result presented, namely 
the fact that strong and weak rebel groups are both more likely to make strong demands relative to 
government sovereignty than rebel groups with average general power. 
This predominant explanation lies at the very heart of the rebels' credibility dilemma. This 
initial empirical and theoretical evidence is justified by the fact that weak groups would be looking 
for credibility and would issue extremely important demands in order to gain credibility. When 
rebel groups become more powerful, the question of credibility seems to deviate from their main 
objectives and demands made should be more moderate. Then finally, when the groups are 
sufficiently powerful, the importance of the demands would be explained by the fact that the 
question of credibility is completely discarded and that the demands carried out – even important 
– come more from a will to realize (Bénabou & Tirole, 2004). Thus, the notion of credibility, in 
our work, must be understood as the need to be taken seriously by the authorities and therefore to 
be heard as a fully-fledged and high-level actor in the negotiation processes, not just as a threat or 
an attraction to engage in or continue fighting (Azad, 2019). 
Just as it is important to anchor the notion of credibility in the general framework of 
international relations and more particularly in peace studies, it is important to define the concept 
of power and in particular the introduction that we have decided to make of the concept of relative 
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power, out of step with the initial study of the rebels’ credibility dilemma. The notion of power of 
rebel groups is quite difficult to estimate and its comparative measurement is something delicate 
(Krause, 2017). If the study from which we decided to start our research measures the power of 
the rebel groups through absolute real capacities only, we decided to couple with these last data 
another relative factor that we decided to attach to the national framework of each movement. If 
this choice seems rather delicate and carries a methodological bias, it seems that specifically in 
relation to the geographical space studied, this relative focus in relation to the states is justified, in 
particular regarding the organization and the national presence of rebel groups. In addition, this 
relative indicator allows us to rule out another methodological bias of comparison with framing on 
the relationship between governments and rebels, knowing that each state does not have the same 
means vis-à-vis rebel groups (Aronson & Huth, 2017). 
Methods 
First, it seems essential to better understand how we selected the rebel groups and all the data 
about them that were useful in our study. Using the non-state actors in civil wars database 
(Cunningham et al., 2013) and supplementing them extensively with existing historical studies, 
national archives from countries of the area and press releases, we have established a list of 48 
rebel groups over a period from 1945 to 2019. Our main selection criterion is conceptual and 
temporal to minimal. Indeed, we chose to select the rebel groups that had a duration of action of 
more than one month, in order to avoid relationships that were too short and left few negotiations, 
as can be the case in a coup d'état. In addition, our definition of a rebel group is characterized by 
its opposition to a government or to a conventional regional authority, as may be the case 
sometimes (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012). 
One of our main notions in the initial hypothesis refers directly to the notion of rebel group 
power. It therefore seemed essential to better introduce this concept which must be palpable and 
quantifiable to compare the different groups with each other through their claims and their relative 
power. However, this concept of power requires relative implementation vis-à-vis the governments 
and countries in which they are, knowing that we first study behaviors within a relationship in the 
form of a complex dyad. For that, we extracted important variables built on the existing work of 
the non-state actors in civil wars database (Cunningham et al., 2013), in order to group together 
the most significant and important variables in the context of establishing a measure, in the form 
of relative power Ρ(r). 
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where 𝑛(𝑟) is the estimate number of rebel group members. The value 𝑝(𝑛) corresponds to the 
total population of the country where the rebel group is acting in relative value to the period of the 
rebel group activity. The variable 𝜌(𝑟) corresponds to the general estimate rebel group's strength 
against the government of which it composes the dyad (three possible values: much weaker = 0.1 ; 
weaker = 0.2 ; moderate = 0.3). The variables 𝛾(𝑟), 𝛼(𝑟) and 𝜑(𝑟) respectively correspond to the 
mobilization capacity, the arming capacity and the combat capacity of the rebel groups relatively 
to their respective dyads (three possible values for each variable: very low = 0.1 ; low = 0.15 ; 
moderate = 0.2). 
Thus, we have a tool for measuring the relative power Ρ(r) of each rebel group, which helps us 
to better match the entire list of demands specific to each rebel group. The measure of the relative 
power that we propose through the indicator P(r) differs quite broadly from the single measure of 
the real absolute capacities of the rebel groups in that it absorbs the capacities by nuancing the 
latter in the face of the different governments making up the dyad. This measure has certain limits, 
in particular with regard to its possible transposition into other geographical areas. Indeed, there 
is the possibility of bias through potential identification and the possibility of problems inferential 
to the use of a relative measure of power (Keith, 2019). However, we believe that with regard to 
the area studied, such a consideration of the relative power is necessary in order to avoid a 
comparison bias, as we have advanced in the theoretical framework. 
In this way, our methodological protocol is based on the notion of power and its comparison 
with the demands of each rebel group for which we have created categorization scales to better 
treat the data retrieved through the various sources cited. 
Scales of Categorization of Demands 
In order to test the general hypothesis of the rebel credibility dilemma theory, it is important to 
return to the initial categorization (Thomas et al., 2016). This first categorization takes in our study 
the name of Scale No. 1, considered as our first base of analysis to offer a first reading of the 
recovered data and especially to verify for the case of Latin America, the results obtained on the 
African area. This Scale No. 1 allows us to classify the various claims and demands of rebel groups 
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around their degree of threat on the sovereignty of the dyad governments. G groups demands that 
could undermine the sovereignty of the government in place directly or indirectly and NG groups 
demands that cannot undermine the sovereignty of the government in place. We consider that a 
demand that undermines the sovereignty of government is a demand that questions the institutional 
and ideological organization of the government, as defined by Stewart (2018). This classification 
allows us to test the initial hypothesis of Thomas, Reed, and Wolford's work on the rebels’ 
credibility dilemma. This first scale can be called scale of importance of demands. 
The other two scales that we have undertaken to formalize are based on observations of the data 
that we have collected, but also on a process of classification by type of requests in order to better 
understand the nature of the demands and especially how demands can be part of a search for 
credibility not only with the government making up the dyad, but also with populations and 
international community. 
Scale No. 2 proposes a primary classification to our approach in order to create three blocks to 
generically classify our data by areas of interest to which the demands of the rebels refer. P groups 
all the requests related to the field of politics, including the whole domain in the scientific meaning 
(Palonen, 2003). E groups all the requests related directly or indirectly to the field of the economy. 
Finally, S groups all social and societal issues outside the political and economic spheres. This 
scale is representative of the areas of the expression of demands that can be made by rebel groups. 
Scale No. 3 is intended as a tool for more accurate analysis of the demands of rebel groups, 
through an axis centred around themes rather than domains. This last scale of analysis includes 18 
themes that we have established according to their relevance to the data exploited and the empirical 
needs of our research. The purpose of this classification is not only to adapt to the data, to present 
the data and to serve as the basis for further demand and claim analysis studies. These themes 
therefore cover all of the data recovered and make it possible to classify each of the requests made 
in one of the categories of this classification scale. ED groups demands about education in general, 
from literacy to university applications. PH brings together demands about public health, from 
campaigning against endemic diseases to creating social security. IR brings together demands 
about international relations, from stopping some diplomatic relations of the government of the 
dyad to the withdrawal of foreign troops on national ground. W groups demands about work and 
working conditions, from the reduction of weekly working hours to the introduction of policies 
about unemployment. SV groups demands about state violence, from the government's cessation 
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of torture to the repeal of state of emergency laws. I groups demands about purely ideological 
claims, from the establishment of a political ideology to religious ideology. SM groups demands 
about social misery, from increased purchasing power to famine. ECO groups demands relating to 
ecology in general, from global environmental protection to the implementation of new 
autonomous energy policies. APP groups demands about the abuse of political power, from 
stopping electoral fraud to stopping corruption. RG groups demands directly related to rebel 
groups, from the release of political prisoners to the conclusion of a ceasefire. EM groups demands 
about ethnic, cultural, political or social minorities, from the creation of an autonomous region to 
the preservation of indigenous rights. M groups demands about moral questions, from the adoption 
of a state religion to the prohibition of marital infidelity. NES groups demands about the national 
economic system, from nationalization of companies to state economic planning. T groups 
demands about taxation in general, from lower taxes to a VAT application only for luxury goods. 
Y groups demands for youth, from the extension of voting rights from 18 years old to the 
construction of orphanages. SSI groups demands about state structures and institutions, from the 
end of the current regime to the modernization of state institutions. GF groups demands about 
general freedoms, whether individual or collective, from the right to demonstrate to the liberation 
of women. Finally, TA groups demands for technological advances, from the development of a 
technological industry to the modernization of agricultural production. 
This last scale seems to be the most important in the final scope of our study. Indeed, it allows 
us to compartmentalize the different demands and to extract essential components in our 
methodological protocol through our basic data. This Scale No. 3 may be called the thematic scale 
of the claims. 
Methodological Protocol and Basic Data 
Our study is therefore based on data we collected from a large sample of rebel groups in Latin 
America from 1945 to 2019.  
This choice is justified by the quantitative importance of the data in this geographical area and 
for this given period, which will allow us to avoid a quantitative bias. In addition, the area studied 
seemed particularly conducive to the study of the rebels’ credibility dilemma, in order to offer a 
comparison with the African study already carried out, especially since the extended period that 
we have chosen corresponds to a new area of claims, battles, and rebellions in Latin America 
(Flores & Rosaldo, 2009). The choice of the extension until 2019 allows to include new rebel 
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groups and especially the most recent requests of the rebel groups still in activity. It also allows us 
to partially eliminate the geographic and temporal bias with the importance of Marxist groups, and 
to include a number of indigenous rebel groups, more numerous since the start of the 21st century 
(Cleary, 2000). Our analysis sample includes 48 rebel groups (Table 1) in 19 Latin American 
countries1, with a total of 828 requests. This distribution allows us to have a wide range of rebel 
groups facing various governments depending on the periods of activity. 
The heterogeneity of our data is characterized by the values of the different relative powers 
Ρ(r), ranging from 0.4016 to 0.9958, as well as in the great diversity of demands made by rebel 
groups during their existence. 
It should also be noted that the total quantity of demands issued by each rebel group differs, but 
however, the distribution as a function of the relative power is fairly homogeneous, which avoids 
this methodological bias of first order. 
Our methodological protocol is based initially on the objective study of each rebel group of our 
sample as well as the government to which it is opposed, in order to extract the essential data to 
calculate the relative power Ρ(r). To do this, it was necessary to build on the work already done on 
non-state actors in civil conflicts (Cunningham et al., 2013), while providing sufficient material 
and research through a thorough study of relations between rebel groups and governments, thanks 
in particular to the historical sources and the national archives of the various states. 
On the other hand, it was necessary to conduct a background study on all the demands made by 
the rebel groups in our sample on their period of activity as a rebel group opposed to a government. 
This research was carried out through various press releases and manifestos issued by rebel groups  
to governments, as well as to the people and the international community. In addition, we also 
studied the various archives available and declassified in order to take into account the demands 
  
 
1 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guadeloupe (France), 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriane & Uruguay. 
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Table 1 
List of studied rebel groups 
Ação Libertadora Nacional (BR) Alliance révolutionnaire caraïbe (FR) Comandos Ernesto Rojas (CO) 
Comision Nestor Paz Zamora (BO) Ejército de Liberación Nacional (CO) Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia 
(BO) 
Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (PY) Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (GT) Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari (BO) 
Ejército Popular de Liberación (CO) Ejército Popular Revolucionario (MX) Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (AR) 
Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (SV) Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (CO) Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
(MX) 
Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad (CL) Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (CL) Frente Patriótico Morazanista (HN) 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 
(NI) 
Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional (PY) Front pour la libération et la reconstruction 
nationales (HT) 
Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (AR) Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (GT) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (CO) 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Indígenas 
del Pacífico (CO) 
Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo 
Martí" (SV) 
Grupo Popular Guerrillero (MX) 
Grupos de Combatientes Populares (EC) Jungle Commando (SR) Montoneros (AR) 
Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro 
(BR) 
Movimiento 19 de Abril (CO) Movimiento 26 de Julio (CU) 
Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (CO) Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(CL) 
Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(PE) 
Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro (CL) Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara (AR) Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre 
(GT) 
Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio 
(DO) 
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru 
(PE) 
Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en 
Armas (GT) 
Partido de los Pobres (MX) Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche (AR) Resistencia Nacional (SV) 
Sendero Luminoso (PE) Tupamaros (UY) Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares 
(BR) 
 
that could be emitted during negotiations between rebel group and government. Thus, we consulted 
all the national archives of the countries concerned in order to recover the documents of 
negotiations, declassified analyses, the manifestos and the declarations—often public—of the  
rebel groups, in order to recover all the demands and claims. Thereafter, we categorized each 
request according to the three categorization scales to obtain the data that we present in this study. 
It seems that some documents are not completely declassified, and we have not been able to 
recover all the documents from certain countries. However, this characteristic does not necessarily 
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induce a bias in our data since the rebel groups in Latin America seem to be extremely 
communicative regarding their demands and claims, especially for the rebel groups closest in time 
(Cortina Orero, 2018). 
Once these data were collected, we tried to transcribe the various classification scales that we 
theorized previously to establish a better readability of the raw data.  
Finally, our study focused on the verification of initial hypotheses, through a similar but 
differentiated methodology, and the release of further results towards the formalization of a new 
theory of the rebels’ credibility dilemma. 
The use of simple linear regression seems to be the best way to test the stated hypotheses in a 
clear and specific manner and thus obtain results according to the intensity of the requests and the 
P(r) indicator. The use of multiple linear regression through the different constituent indices of 
P(r) does not provide more information and does not allow us to take into account the relativity of 
the power of the rebel groups according to governments making up the dyad. 
Results and Critical Review 
The Search for Basic Credibility 
When we try to get a better understanding of the distribution of requests, we realize that, in 
general, G demands represent only a small part of the total claims, accounting for 18.63% of total 
demands. This small proportion seems to be general and is not limited to P(r). That is to say that 
in general, rebel groups make fewer G-type demands. However, in order to better characterize the 
general distribution of these demands, according to the relative power of the rebel groups, it is 
essential to compare these different parts of G and NG demands with our relative power indicator 
Ρ(r) (Fig. 1). 
 13 
Figure 1 
G demands in relation to the power P(r) 
 
The results of our study seem to show quite distinctly that there is an important relationship 
between the relative power P(r) of rebel groups and the demands of rebel groups in a dyad 
relationship with governments over the time and space geographically studied. Thus, in a global 
manner, rebel groups would tend to issue a higher number of G demands when their relative power 
against a government would be too weak, with the primary aim of finding credibility in the 
negotiation process. This quest for credibility with governments and through G demands seems to 
be lost as rebel groups gain relative power P(r) in relation to the power of governments. This trend 
can be seen in a small part of G demands or rather an exclusivity of NG demands.  
Contrary to the initial observation of the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma, our sample 
shows that groups with the highest relative power emit very few G demands. However, the general 
trend initially proposed seems to be verified through our sample and this allows us to characterize, 
in certain proportions, the behavior of rebel groups and their search for initial credibility, as we 
defined it. 






















Parts of G demands
G demands in relation to the power Ρ(r)
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These results of our sample do not seem to be influenced by the different possible outcomes of 
the conflicts when they are over. Similarly, there seems to be no prior relationship between these 
results and the types of ideology of rebel groups and those of different governments. There also 
seems to be no geographical trend, which allows us to see a global phenomenon throughout the 
region, or by extension to all rebel groups, but it is impossible to broadly extend these results 
empirically for all rebel groups. The difficulty of a global analysis raises the question of the 
importance of regional particularities in our analysis. Indeed, regarding our sample, it seems that 
the initial trend is verified, but we cannot extend these results without global data concerning the 
demands of rebel groups. 
It is possible to discuss this first advanced result, in particular on the effects of this relationship, 
in order to know if the search for credibility is at the heart of the demands of rebel groups. We can 
also discuss the reliability of the indicator P(r) which not only categorizes the groups according to 
absolute real capacities, invariably making them fit into boxes which sometimes are not 
sufficiently revealing of the rebel groups’ power, but also the more we can question the importance 
of the relativity of this measure. Indeed, the relativity of power has been measured through the 
relationship between rebel groups and governments. Regarding the area studied, the majority of 
rebel groups acted and placed themselves within a national framework and therefore could be 
compared to national governments. However, transnational or local rebel groups located in sub-
state bodies therefore form an important methodological bias which should be taken into account 
in other geographical or temporal areas (Arslan, 2018). In addition, the low share of G demands 
allows us to question the reality and the tangibility of these requests within the negotiation process, 
even if the trend seems confirmed on the studied sample. 
Beyond the explanation we offer through the theory of the rebels' credibility and the importance 
of this credibility, other works allow us to put these results in perspective through a double-
explanatory mechanism. Indeed, the demands of rebel groups tend to be a lever for negotiation 
with government authorities and the perception of power is a primary issue for rebel groups (Jenne 
et al., 2007). However, it would seem that the perception of power pushes rebel groups, in an 
opposite logic, to make more extreme demands (Ayres, 2000), and that these demands are notably 
motivated by brutal changes in negotiation situations (Toft, 2006). 
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Thus, during our research, we found that other factors and relationships were consistent with 
the search for other credibilities, and that it did not focus solely on a search for a general credibility, 
or rather a unique credibility with governments. 
International and Popular Credibility 
The addition to the classification Scale No. 3 of the demands of a group indexing the IR 
demands about international relations allowed us to draw a rather interesting trend concerning the 
search for credibility of the rebel groups (Fig. 2). 
A relation therefore seems to be established between the relative power P(r) and the part of IR 
demands. This tendency is observed in the sense that the more a rebel group has a relative power 
P(r), the more it seems to be inclined to perform at least one IR demand. However, we note that in 
general, the place of IR demands is not preponderant despite the fact that the trend seems quite 
clear. This small proportion can be interpreted as marking the fact that for the area studied, the 
preponderance of the state and societal framework does not offer a sufficiently important place to 
international bodies over the period given (Legler, 2013). 
These results pave the way for a further degree of analysis in understanding the phenomenon 
of the rebels' search for credibility. Indeed, we are now able to consider the search for international 
credibility as an additional phase of credibility research with a third party to the original dyad 
between rebel group and government. This third actor which can be interpreted as the whole of the 
international scene, is particularly noticeable in the content of IR demands, and in the importance 




IR demands in relation to the power P(r) 
 
The vision of a new phase is indicative of a search for credibility completed, facing a new 
dimension of the search for credibility for larger rebel groups.  
However, the results seem to show that the search for international credibility is not a constant 
depending on the power of the rebel groups, prompting us to recognize that there is a search for 
significant international credibility on the part of the rebel groups, but that this is not necessarily 
proportional to its relative power. We find the importance of this international dimension of rebel 
groups in numerous works, and our results further highlight the importance of this international 
dimension (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005). Putting this search for credibility into perspective leads 
us to think that, given the data on the area studied, the rebel groups are increasingly seeking to 
gain credibility and recognition from the international community, which has become a central 
actor, nowadays, in negotiations and peacekeeping processes in particular (Jo, 2015). 
Alongside this third actor, is another actor outside of the original dyad. Indeed, it seems that 
there is a search for popular credibility through important social, economic, and political demands 
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in favor of the populations. To better understand this, we sought to gather its various demands 
through the Scale No. 3 categorization of demands, gathering ED, PH, W, SV, SM, ECO, APP, 
EM, T, Y, GF demands (Fig. 3). The grouping of these categories is interpreted as an attempt to 
mobilize popular demands, which can be shared with a large segment of the population, or more 
generally which are established for the populations to improve their conditions in particular. We 
thus find there the requests relating to education; public health; working conditions; state violence; 
social misery; ecology; potential abuse of political power; minorities ethnic; taxes; youth; and 
general freedoms. 
The results seem to show that there is no relationship between the relative power P(r) and the 
popular demands, which suggests that the search for popular credibility would be permanent or 
steady for all rebel groups. 
These results allow us to further broaden the spectrum of analysis that is the theory of the rebels' 
credibility dilemma and to better understand the mechanisms of reflection and action in terms of 
game theory in this kind of conflict situation. However, the results presented are open to discussion 
and it would seem that this precise study on a geographical area such as Latin America may have 
some biases. These biases could appear, first of all, through the representation of Marxist-
communist ideology as a prominent sub-category of rebel group in the area and the studied 
duration (67% of the sample). Similarly, it is possible to discuss the different types of conflicts, 
including conflicts that have benefited from external assistance, both for rebel groups and for 
governments, and the impacts of such external assistance on demands, relative power of rebel 
groups, and ultimately their search for credibility. 
Nevertheless, the whole point of research in the field now lies in taking into account these two 
third-party actors, namely the international community and the populations, in order to better 
understand the influences of these actors on the search for credibility of rebel groups. 
This accounting of the third-party actors has already taken place through various research works 
on transnationalism (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, all the contributions of the results that we 
have just provided is to consider these aspects through the search for credibility of rebel groups in 





Popular demands in relation to the power P(r) 
 
The results that we advance here are operable with regard to the temporal period and the 
geographic space of Latin America and therefore the specificities of this space as much as of the 
period studied. However, a series of historical, political, and social studies would make it possible 
to confirm, refute or corroborate all of these results, over different periods and spaces, but also by 
implementing different methodologies and data. 
In addition, the mechanisms and dynamics of these interactions and these relations of influence 
seem more than interesting for in-depth study, in particular from a psychological point of view 
through the didactic logic of the psychosociological study of conflicts and multiple negotiations. 
We can also discuss the use of scales, whose completeness seems full for the area studied, but 
which might not be for other areas and other temporality. In addition, despite the definitions we 
have given, it seems that certain requests are at the borders of several categories, which also poses 
a problem in the methodology as we have established it. 
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Modelling the Credibility Dilemma with Four Actors 
The results that we obtained thanks to our sample allow us to set up a new model of the dilemma. 
We were able to confirm, on our sample, that the hypotheses of the dilemma had an influence on 
the relations of the initial dyad, through demands made by the rebel groups. In addition, we have 
extracted demands relating to international issues and societal issues by assuming that they did not 
only have their source in the relations of the dyad. 
Thus, we left the dyad to consider the demands of the rebel groups as directed not only towards 
the government, but also towards the international community and towards the people. 
From these basic hypotheses, we have developed a model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma 
with four actors, trying to understand through theoretical and empirical hypotheses the objectives 
of these demands as a function of the relative power of the rebel groups (Fig. 4). 
Our general model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma assumes that all rebel groups – regardless 
of relative power – issue popular demands to the people. We also assume that the more powerful 
a rebel group is, compared to a government, the more international demands it will make to the 
international community, and the weaker a rebel group is, compared to a government, the more it 
will make demands that jeopardize the sovereignty of the government. 
The search for popular credibility of the rebel groups seems to be an objective at all times, 
knowing that the vast majority of the rebel groups studied claim to be part of the people, their 
sufferings, and their problems (Eck, 2014). This search for credibility seems to have the ultimate 
objective of obtaining not only moral and ideological support from the people, but also their 
material support in the event that fighting can take place (Wood, 2013). This search for support 
does not seem to be characterized by the power of rebel groups and, on the contrary, seems to be 
central in the negotiation process, especially in the public communication of requests (Larson & 
Lewis, 2018). 
The search for credibility with governments through strong and important demands affecting 
the sovereignty of these governments is an important issue for rebel groups seeking to assert 
themselves and to give credibility to claims that are more important to them (Buhaug, 2006). Our 
explanatory hypotheses relate to the fact that the rebel groups seek to appear more important and 
powerful than they really are when there is a need for them to do so, for example to have certain 
requests accepted or to make an act of presence and pressure (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). 
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Figure 4 
The credibility dilemma model 
 
Finally, the search for international credibility is an objective that we could classify as 
secondary or even tertiary in the objectives of the rebel groups through their requests. In fact, these 
requests come after popular and governmental requests, and constitute a search for credibility that 
we could qualify as final credibility, through international institutions. This research manifests 
itself notably through international standards and international dialogue, giving an echo to the rebel 
group through its credibility (Mueller, 2014). In addition, rebel groups may be willing to find a 
third player in the international community who could act as a mediator in relations between the 
rebels and the government (Duursma, 2014). Finally, the whole dynamic of transnational 
rebellions seems to carry a very interesting example which allows us to get out of the simple 
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relationship of dyads and to undertake the international community as a primordial stake of the 
initial dilemma through the demands of rebel groups (Salehyan, 2007). 
Conclusion 
Thus, we presented a new approach to the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma. Thanks to 
the use of new data on a geographical area and a specific period, we sought to confirm the already 
existing results in the discipline. We have also introduced two new concepts to the theory of the 
rebels' credibility dilemma by conceptualizing two new actors to whom rebel groups are seeking 
credibility: the international community and the people. 
 We have shown that weaker rebel groups tend to make larger demands for the purpose of 
seeking credibility. We have distinguished this search for credibility by specifying it as intended 
for governments. We have shown that the strongest rebel groups tend to make more demands on 
international affairs in order to seek credibility with the international community. We have shown 
that all rebel groups seem to make a number of popular demands in order to gain credibility with 
the population. Finally, we have conceptualized through our hypothesis, a new model of rebels’ 
credibility dilemma with four actors. 
The confirmation of all these results must involve studies on other geographical areas and other 
time periods. It would be interesting to seek a better understanding of the relations between the 
rebel groups and these new actors, as well as the relations between the governments and these new 
actors in the context of the dyadic relationship with the rebel groups. It would also be interesting 
to study more specifically the search for credibility among the populations in order to better 
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